Envy Freeness in Experimental Fair Division Problems
AbstractIn the recent experimental literature several social preference models have been suggested that address observed behavior not reducible to the pursuit of self-interest. Inequality aversion is one such model where preferences are distributional. Frequently, envy is suggested as the underlying rationale for inequality aversion. Envy is a central criterion in the theoretical literature on fair division, whose definition (Foley 1967) differs from the more casual use of the word in the experimental literature. We present and discuss results from free-form bargaining experiments on fair division problems where the role of envy in Foley’s sense can be analyzed and compared to social preferences. We find that envy freeness does matter as a secondary criterion.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse28_2004.
Date of creation: Dec 2004
Date of revision:
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Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
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Fairness; Envy Freeness; Social Preferences; Bargaining;
Other versions of this item:
- Dorothea Herreiner & Clemens Puppe, 2009. "Envy Freeness in Experimental Fair Division Problems," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(1), pages 65-100, July.
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-01-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2005-01-16 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2005-01-16 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2005-01-16 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2005-01-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2005-01-16 (Microeconomics)
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