• NEP-ALL-2005-12-14 (All new papers)

1. Eyal Winter, 2001. "Scapegoats and Optimal Allocation of Responsibility," Discussion Paper Series dp266, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
2. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1986. "A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 366-376, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Dewatripont, Mathias, 1988. "Commitment through Renegotiation-Proof Contracts with Third Parties," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(3), pages 377-89, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Itoh, Hideshi, 1992. "Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 321-45, April.
6. Cremer, Jacques, 1995. "Arm's Length Relationships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(2), pages 275-95, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 444-460, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Oliver Hart, 2003. "Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(486), pages C69-C76, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Oliver Hart, 2002. "Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 02/061, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
9. TIROLE, Jean, 1991. "Collusion and the Theory of Organizations," IDEI Working Papers 9, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
10. Barry W. Ickes & Larry Samuelson, 1987. "Job Transfers and Incentives in Complex Organizations: Thwarting the Ratchet Effect," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 275-286, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 153-173, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances," CEPR Discussion Papers 2698, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Pitchford, Rohan, 1998. "Moral hazard and limited liability: The real effects of contract bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 251-259, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 169-82, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Baliga, Sandeep & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1998. "Decentralization and Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 196-232, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1998. "Decentralization and Collusion," Discussion Papers 1210, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    • Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1996. "Decentralization and Collusion," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1757, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
15. Georg Noeldeke & Klaus Schmidt, 1998. "Sequential Investments and Options to Own," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Nöldeke, Georg & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1997. "Sequential Investments and Options to Own," CEPR Discussion Papers 1645, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Georg Noeldeke & Klaus Schmidt, 1998. "Sequential Investments and Options to Own," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 633-653, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Riordan, Michael H & Sappington, David E M, 1987. "Information, Incentives, and Organizational Mode," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 243-63, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Bengt Holmstrom, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," NBER Working Papers 6875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1997. "Information Management in Incentive Problems," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 796-821, August.
19. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1998. "Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 127(4), pages 622-, December.
    Other versions:
    • Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1996. "Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9602, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
20. George A. Akerlof & Lawrence F. Katz, 1989. "Workers' Trust Funds and the Logic of Wage Profiles," NBER Working Papers 2548, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Akerlof, George A & Katz, Lawrence F, 1989. "Workers' Trust Funds and the Logic of Wage Profiles," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(3), pages 525-36, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Dana Jr. James D., 1993. "The Organization and Scope of Agents: Regulating Multiproduct Industries," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 288-310, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Meyer, Margaret A., 1995. "Cooperation and competition in organizations: A dynamic perspective," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 709-722, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
24. Yeon-Koo Che & Seung-Weon Yoo, 2001. "Optimal Incentives for Teams," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 525-541, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
25. Lazear, Edward P, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(4), pages 606-20, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
26. Baron, David P & Besanko, David, 1992. "Information, Control, and Organizational Structure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 1(2), pages 237-75, Summer.
27. Richard J. Gilbert & Michael H. Riordan, 1995. "Regulating Complementary Products: A Comparative Institutional Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 243-256, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
28. Laux, Christian, 2001. "Limited-Liability and Incentive Contracting with Multiple Projects," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 514-26, Autumn.

Cited by:
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1. Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 6467, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse26_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   • Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 315-329, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2006. "'Build It or Not': Normative and Positive Theories of Public-Private Partnerships," CEPR Discussion Papers 5610, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse25_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(6), pages 727-738, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)