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Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment

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  • Klaus Abbink
  • Heike Hennig-Schmidt

Abstract

This paper contributes to the ongoing methodological debate on context-free versus in-context presentation of experimental tasks. We report an experiment using the paradigm of a bribery experiment. In one condition, the task is presented in a typical bribery context, the other one uses abstract wording. Though the underlying context is heavily loaded with negative ethical preconceptions, we do not find significant differences. We conjecture that the experimental design transmits the essential features of a bribery situation already with neutral framing, such that the presentation does not add substantially to subjects' interpretation of the task.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse23_2002.

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Length: 20
Date of creation: Oct 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse23_2002

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Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de

Related research

Keywords: Corruption; context; framing; valence; experimental instructions; laboratory; trust; reciprocity; ethical behaviour; social norms;

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References

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