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Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment

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Author Info
Klaus Abbink
Heike Hennig-Schmidt
Abstract

This paper contributes to the ongoing methodological debate on context-free versus in-context presentation of experimental tasks. We report an experiment using the paradigm of a bribery experiment. In one condition, the task is presented in a typical bribery context, the other one uses abstract wording. Though the underlying context is heavily loaded with negative ethical preconceptions, we do not find significant differences. We conjecture that the experimental design transmits the essential features of a bribery situation already with neutral framing, such that the presentation does not add substantially to subjects' interpretation of the task.

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Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse23_2002.

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Length: 20
Date of creation: Oct 2002
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Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse23_2002

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Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
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Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=494

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Related research
Keywords: Corruption; context; framing; valence; experimental instructions; laboratory; trust; reciprocity; ethical behaviour; social norms;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  3. Keser, Claudia & Rullière, Jean-Louis & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 1999. "Union Bargaining Strength as a Public Good: Experimental Evidence," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-20, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
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    Other versions:
  14. David J. Cooper et al., 1999. "Gaming against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 781-804, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Carpenter, Jeffrey & Burks, Stephen & Verhoogen, Eric, 2004. "Comparing Students to Workers: The Effects of Social Framing on Behavior in Distribution Games," IZA Discussion Papers 1341, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  2. Fernanda Rivas, 2006. "An experiment on corruption and gender," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0806, Department of Economics - dECON. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro, 2004. "Cultural Education and the Voluntary Provision of Cultural Goods: An Experimental Study," Experimental 0404003, EconWPA, revised 27 Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Vivi Alatas & Lisa Cameron & Ananish Chaudhuri & Nisvan Erkal & Lata Gangadharan, 2006. "Subject Pool Effects in a Corruption Experiment: A Comparison of Indonesian Public Servants and Indonesian Students," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 975, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005. "Corruption as Betrayal : Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation," Working Papers 0506, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. L. Cameron & A. Chaudhuri & N. Erkal & L. Gangadharan, 2005. "Do Attitudes Towards Corruption Differ Across Cultures? Experimental Evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia andSingapore," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 943, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  7. Libor Dušek & Andreas Ortman & Lubomír Lízal, 2005. "Understanding Corruption And Corruptibility Through Experiments," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2005(2), pages 147-162. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Vivi Alatas & Lisa Cameron & Ananish Chaudhuri & Nisvan Erkal & Lata Gangadharan, 2006. "Gender and Corruption: Insights from an Experimental Analysis," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 974, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  9. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro, 2005. "Cultural Goods and Laboratory Experiments," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 05/06, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised May 2005. [Downloadable!]
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