Taking a shower in Youth Hostels: risks and delights of heterogeneity
AbstractTuning one's shower in some hotels may turn into a challenging coordination game with imperfect information. The temperature sensitivity increases with the number of agents, making the problem possibly unlearnable. Because there is in practice a finite number of possible tap positions, identical agents are unlikely to reach even approximately their favorite water temperature. Heterogeneity allows some agents to reach much better temperatures, at the cost of higher risk.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse1_2008.
Date of creation: Jan 2008
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coordination; heterogeneity; adaptive learning; non-linear system; feedback;
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- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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"Shedding light on El Farol,"
Game Theory and Information
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