Economists invoke Mundell (1961) in arguing for the general policy of  a flexible exchange rate regime as a means of restoring equilibria  after shocks. But there is a discrepancy between the intent of the  general policy and attempts at its implementation as identified by  specific changes in exchange rates.  When we assemble the set of  specific changes called for by distinct economists operating as  advocates for individual countries, these are uniformly in the form  of beggar-thy-neighbour advice – ie travesties of objectively  identifying disequilibria and a menace to international cooperation  and peace.  This paper traces the unintended travesties to problems  of complexity and uncertainty, problems that implicitly are assumed  absent in Mundell (1961) rendering the situation so simple that  equilibria are transparent.  The problems remained essentially  unaddressed when economists extended Mundell (1961) via expected  utility theory since this theory also ignores the impossibility of  maximising and the complexities of central bankers, private firms and  others in doing the evaluation stage in reaching decisions.  The  problems can be overcome by modelling within SKAT, the Stages of  Knowledge Ahead Theory.  This paper points to experimental evidence  in support of the view that under all sorts of disequilibrating  shocks, currency unions outperform flexible currencies by eliminating  the inefficiencies generated by exchange rate uncertainty.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number
bgse1_2007.
Length: 26 Date of creation: Date of revision:
Nov 2007 Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse1_2007
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