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Firm Size, Economic Situation and Influence Activities

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Author Info
Matthias Kräkel ()

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Abstract

This paper discusses the optimal firm size in the presence of influence activities, and the level of individual rent-seeking dependent on the economic situation of the firm. Since size has a discouraging effect on the level of individual rent-seeking but also a quantity effect as the number of rent-seekers increases, the interplay of both effects determines whether the employer chooses an inefficiently small or large firm size. In the given setting, a bad economic situation leads to both a higher probability of a substantial loss and a reduction of productivity. The productivity effect and the two other effects together determine the optimal level of individual rent-seeking.

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File URL: ftp://web.bgse.uni-bonn.de/pub/RePEc/bon/bonedp/bgse16_2006.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse16_2006.

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Length: 25
Date of creation: Sep 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse16_2006

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Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 9221
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=494

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Related research
Keywords: economic situation firm size influence activities politicking rent-seeking

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Holmstrom, Bengt & Roberts, John, 1998. "The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 73-94, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bagwell, Laurie Simon & Zechner, Josef, 1993. " Influence Costs and Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(3), pages 975-1008, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Fairburn, James A. & Malcomson, James M., 1994. "Rewarding performance by promotion to a different job," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 683-690, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Konrad, Kai A, 2000. "Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 155-65, April.
  5. Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-80, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Konrad, Kai A., 2004. "Bidding in hierarchies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 1301-1308, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Roman Inderst & Holger Müller & Karl Wärneryd, 2005. "Influence costs and hierarchy," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 177-197, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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