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The Framing of Games and the Psychology of Play

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Author Info
Heike Hennig-Schmidt ()
Abstract

Psychological game theory can help provide a rational choice explanation of framing effects; frames influence beliefs, beliefs influence motivations. We explain this theoretically, and explore the empirical relevance experimentally. In a 2×2 design of one-shot public good games we show that frames affect subject’s first- and second-order beliefs, and contributions. From a psychological game-theoretic framework we derive two mutually compatible hypotheses about guilt aversion and reciprocity under which contributions are related to second- and first-order beliefs, respectively. Our results are consistent with either.

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File URL: ftp://web.bgse.uni-bonn.de/pub/RePEc/bon/bonedp/bgse15_2008.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse15_2008.

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Length: 40
Date of creation: Jul 2008
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Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse15_2008

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Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 9221
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=494

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Daniel Park).

Related research
Keywords: Framing; psychological games; guilt aversion; reciprocity; public good games; voluntary cooperation;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism
Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology

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  1. R. Cookson, 2000. "Framing Effects in Public Goods Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 55-79, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Elliott, Catherine S. & Hayward, Donald M. & Canon, Sebastian, 1998. "Institutional framing: Some experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 455-464, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2004. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 268-298, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Burnham, Terence & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon L., 2000. "Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-73, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Croson, Rachel T. A., 2000. "Thinking like a game theorist: factors affecting the frequency of equilibrium play," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 299-314, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2007. "Guilt in Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 170-176, May. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Tjøtta, Sigve & Torsvik, Gaute, 2007. "Testing Guilt Aversion," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 683, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Huang, Peter H & Wu, Ho-Mou, 1994. "More Order without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 390-406, October.
  9. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Bacharach, Michael & Bernasconi, Michele, 1997. "The Variable Frame Theory of Focal Points: An Experimental Study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-45, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Joel Sobel, 2005. "Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 43(2), pages 392-436, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Rege, Mari & Telle, Kjetil, 2004. "The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in public good situations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1625-1644, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Sonnemans, Joep & Schram, Arthur & Offerman, Theo, 1998. "Public good provision and public bad prevention: The effect of framing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 143-161, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Park, Eun-Soo, 2000. "Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: a further experimental study of framing effects on free-riding," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 405-421, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Levin, Irwin P. & Schneider, Sandra L. & Gaeth, Gary J., 1998. "All Frames Are Not Created Equal: A Typology and Critical Analysis of Framing Effects," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 149-188, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2005. "Dynamic Psychological Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000046, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Michael Bacharach & Gerardo Guerra & Daniel Zizzo, 2007. "The Self-Fulfilling Property of Trust: An Experimental Study," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(4), pages 349-388, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Vincent Crawford, 1992. "Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 92-02r, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    Other versions:
  19. Gari Walkowitz & Sebastian J. Goerg, 2007. "The Janus Face of Cooperation - An Intra- and Cross-Cultural Review," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse5_2007, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  20. Kenneth Clark & Stephen Kay & Martin Sefton, 2001. "When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 495-515. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  21. Forsythe Robert & Horowitz Joel L. & Savin N. E. & Sefton Martin, 1994. "Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 347-369, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Christoph Vanberg, 2008. "Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations -super-1," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1467-1480, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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