Financing Infrastructure under Budget Constraint
AbstractIn this paper we consider the problem of financing infrastructure when the regulator faces a budget constraint. The optimal budget-constrained mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient firms produce the same quantity. The second property is self-selection for the less efficient firms. The third property is that the mechanism is a third best one. In other words, as long as the budget-constraint is binding, the optimal output is strictly lower than the second best output for any given type. Finally, if the budget constraint is too strong, then we have a full bunching solution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse15_2002.
Date of creation: Jun 2002
Date of revision:
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Regulation; Asymmetric Information; Budget Constraint;
Other versions of this item:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-09-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2002-09-21 (Public Economics)
- NEP-REG-2002-09-21 (Regulation)
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