An Elementary Approach to the Hold-Up Problem with Renegotiation
AbstractSo far, the existing literature on the hold-up problem with renegotiation has imposed assumptions such that the post-renegotiation payoffs are absolutely continuous functions. Since payoffs may fail to be differentiable at the investment profile to be sustained, first order conditions for incentives to invest must be handled with care. To avoid these difficulties, the present paper propagates a more elementary approach. A general condition is provided which necessarily must hold for an investment profile to be sustainable by a message contingent contract. If only one of the parties invests or, more generally, if investments can be aggregated into one dimension then the paper introduces assumptions leading to conditions which are necessary and sufficient for an investment profile to be sustainable.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse15_2000.
Date of creation: Nov 2000
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hold-up problem; renegotiation; mechanism design; message contingent contracts;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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- Andreas Roider, 2006.
"Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)Complete Contract,"
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- Andreas Roider, 2003. "Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse8_2003, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Aug 2004.
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