Doping in Contest-Like Situations
AbstractIndividuals who compete in a contest-like situation (for example, in sports, in promotion tournaments, or in an appointment contest) may have an incentive to illegally utilize resources in order to improve their relative positions. We analyze such doping within a tournament game between two heterogeneous players. Three major e.ects are identified which determine a player’s doping decision — a cost e.ect, a likelihood e.ect and a windfall-profit e.ect. Moreover, we discuss whether the favorite or the underdog is more likely to be doped, the impact of doping on overall performance, the influence of increased heterogeneity on doping, the welfare implications of doping, and possible prevention of doping.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse14_2005.
Date of creation: May 2005
Date of revision:
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contest; doping; drugs; fraud in research; tournament;
Other versions of this item:
- Kräkel, Matthias, 2005. "Doping in Contest-Like Situations," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 46, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2005-12-14 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-SPO-2005-12-14 (Sports & Economics)
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