Positive and Negative Team Identity in a Promotion Game
AbstractAbstract: In this paper we experimentally investigate whether the so-called in-group/out-group bias leads to a favoring of own team members as candidates in promotion (by voting for them) relative to other teams and their members. In contrast to psychological approaches, mon- etary incentives for voting choices are implemented and objective performance criteria defined and thus the extent of the in-group/out-group bias is exactly measured. Our data show that face-to-face interaction with team members leads more subjects to favor own team-mates than in anonymous interaction. Moreover, not only the frequency but also the average extent of positive team identity is higher with face-to-face interaction according to objective performance measures. A further finding suggests that only anonymous team interaction often leads to substantial discrimination of own team members (i.e., negative team identity), which also is an interesting new finding and extends previous indings of psychologists on the in-group/out-group bias.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse13_2008.
Date of creation: Jun 2008
Date of revision:
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Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
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Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=494
Team identity; promotion; experiments;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-06-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-06-27 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2008-06-27 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2008-06-27 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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