Achieving the First Best in Sequencing Problems
AbstractIn a sequencing problem with linear time cost, Suijs (1996) proved that it is possible to achieve first best. By first best we mean that one can find mechanisms that satisfy efficiency of decision, dominant strategy incentive compatibility and budget balancedness. In this paper we show that among a more general and natural class of sequencing problems, sequencing problems with linear cost is the only class for which first best can be achieved.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse11_2001.
Date of creation: Nov 2000
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de
Sequencing problems; Dominant strategy incentive compatibility; Efficiency; Budget balancedness;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2006.
"Group Strategyproofness in Queueing Models,"
Economics Discussion Papers
610, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Manipushpak Mitra & Roland Hain, 2001.
"Simple Sequencing Problems with Interdependent Costs,"
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers
bgse20_2001, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Hain, Roland & Mitra, Manipushpak, 2004. "Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 271-291, August.
- Moulin, Herve, 2004. "On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting and Transferring of Jobs," Working Papers 2004-04, Rice University, Department of Economics.
- Youngsub Chun, 2011. "Consistency and monotonicity in sequencing problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 29-41, February.
- Gershkov, Alex & Schweinzer, Paul, 2006.
"When queueing is better than push and shove,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
144, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2012. "Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 473-480, March.
- Conan Mukherjee, 2013. "Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 131-163, February.
- KayI, Çagatay & Ramaekers, Eve, 2010.
"Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 220-232, January.
- RAMAEKERS, Eve & KAYI, Cagatay, 2008. "Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems," CORE Discussion Papers 2008084, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- KAYI, Cagatay & RAMAEKERS, Eve, . "Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2179, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2008. "Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Rule in Queueing Problems: A Relationship between Equity and Efficiency," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 08-17, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
- MISHRA, Debasis & RANGARAJAN, Bharath, 2005.
"Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2005053, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Chun, Youngsub, 2006. "A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 171-181, March.
- Moulin, Hervé, 2008. "Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 567-587, July.
- Moulin, Herve, 2005. "Split-Proof Probabilistic Scheduling," Working Papers 2004-06, Rice University, Department of Economics.
- René Brink & Youngsub Chun, 2012. "Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 519-529, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (BGSE Office).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.