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Can You Guess the Game You're Playing?

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Author Info

  • Jörg Oechssler
  • Burkhard C. Schipper

Abstract

Recently there has been much theoretical and experimental work on learning in games. However, learning usually means "learning about the strategic behavior of opponents" rather than "learning about the game" as such. In contrast, here we report on an experiment designed to test whether players learn a) the relevant features of the payoff structure of a 2x2 game (e.g. the best reply structure) and b) whether they play according to equilibrium predictions regardless of how question a) is being answered. Question a) is being tested by asking subjects to guess the payoff structure of their opponents in a repeated encounter and rewarding subjects for correct answers.

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File URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse11_2000.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse11_2000.

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Length: 17
Date of creation: Sep 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse11_2000

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Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de

Related research

Keywords: Learning; Subjective Games; Experiments;

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References

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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
  2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, December.
  3. Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Learning about Stochastic Payoff Structures," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-7, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  4. Osborne, M-J & Rubinstein, A, 1997. "Games with Procedurally Rational Players," Papers 4-97, Tel Aviv.
  5. Huck Steffen & Sarin Rajiv, 2004. "Players With Limited Memory," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-27, September.
  6. Sarin, Rajiv & Vahid, Farshid, 1999. "Payoff Assessments without Probabilities: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 294-309, August.
  7. Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P. & Broseta, Bruno, 1998. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt1vn4h7x5, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  8. Abbink, Klaus & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 1995. "RatImage - research Assistance Toolbox for Computer-Aided Human Behavior Experiments," Discussion Paper Serie B 325, University of Bonn, Germany.
  9. Sarin, Rajiv & Vahid, Farshid, 2001. "Predicting How People Play Games: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 104-122, January.
  10. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-45, May.
  11. Sethi, Rajiv, 2000. "Stability of Equilibria in Games with Procedurally Rational Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 85-104, July.
  12. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-81, September.
  13. Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Towards a Theory of Subjective Games," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-9, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  14. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1995. "Subjective games and equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 123-163.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Michalis Drouvelis & Wieland Mueller & Alex Possajennikov, 2009. "Signaling without common prior: An experiment," Discussion Papers 2009-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  2. Dietmar Fehr & Dorothea Kübler & David Danz, 2010. "Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-form Game," CIG Working Papers SP II 2010-02, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  3. Philippe Jehiel & Steffen Huck & Tom Rutter, 2007. "Learning Spillover and Analogy-based Expectations: a Multi-Game Experiment," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000120, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Ishikawa, Ryuichiro & Akiyama, Eizo, 2009. "Learning games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(10), pages 1739-1756, October.
  5. Andreas Nicklisch, 2011. "Learning strategic environments: an experimental study of strategy formation and transfer," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 539-558, October.
  6. Apesteguia, Jose, 2006. "Does information matter in the commons?: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 55-69, May.
  7. Angelo Antoci & Pier Sacco & Luca Zarri, 2004. "Coexistence of Strategies and Culturally-Specific Common Knowledge: An Evolutionary Analysis," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 165-194, May.
  8. Grimm, Veronika & Mengel, Friederike, 2012. "An experiment on learning in a multiple games environment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2220-2259.
  9. GEORGANTZIS, Nikolaos & moner-colonques, Rafael & ORTS, Vicente & SEMPERE-MONERRIS, José J., 2012. "Theoretical and experimental insights on firms’ internationalization decisions under uncertainty," CORE Discussion Papers 2012041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Andreas Nicklisch, 2004. "Perceiving strategic environments -An experimental study of strategy formation and transfer-," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-26, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  11. Andreas Nicklisch, 2006. "Perceiving strategic environments: An experimental study of learning under minimal information," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_17, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  12. Alexander Smajgl, 2004. "Modelling the effect of learning and evolving rules on the use of common-pool resources," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 178, Society for Computational Economics.
  13. Scroggin, Steven, 2003. "Bounded Rationality in Randomization," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt1974b8tz, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  14. Drouvelis, Michalis & Müller, Wieland & Possajennikov, Alex, 2012. "Signaling without a common prior: Results on experimental equilibrium selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 102-119.
  15. Alexander Smajgl, 2007. "Modelling evolving rules for the use of common-pool resources in an agent-based model," Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems - scientific journal, Croatian Interdisciplinary Society Provider Homepage: http://indecs.eu, vol. 5(2), pages 56-80.

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