Using Shapley’s asymmetric power index to measure banks’ contributions to systemic risk
AbstractAn individual bank can put the whole banking system at risk if its losses in response to shocks push losses for the system as a whole above a critical threshold. We determine the contribution of banks to this systemic risk using a generalisation of the Shapley value; a concept originating in co-operative game theory. An important feature of this approach is that the order in which banks fail in response to a shock depends on the composition of the banks’ asset portfolios and capital buffers. We show how these factors affect banks’ contributions to systemic risk, and the extent to which these contributions depend on the level of the critical threshold.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bank of England in its series Bank of England working papers with number 468.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 26 Oct 2012
Date of revision:
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Shapley value; systemic risk; bank regulation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-11-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2012-11-03 (Banking)
- NEP-FMK-2012-11-03 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-GTH-2012-11-03 (Game Theory)
- NEP-RMG-2012-11-03 (Risk Management)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Larry Eisenberg & Thomas H. Noe, 2001. "Systemic Risk in Financial Systems," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 47(2), pages 236-249, February.
- Gauthier, CÃ©line & Lehar, Alfred & Souissi, Moez, 2012. "Macroprudential capital requirements and systemic risk," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 594-618.
- S.C. Littlechild & G.F. Thompson, 1977. "Aircraft Landing Fees: A Game Theory Approach," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 186-204, Spring.
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