Fair and Efficient Assignment via the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism
AbstractThis paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. We offer two characterizations of the prominent lottery assignment mechanism called the probabilistic serial. We show that it is the only mechanism satisfying non-wastefulness and ordinal fairness. Our second result shows that a direct ordinal mechanism satisfies ordinal efficiency, envy-freeness, and upper invariance if and only if it is the probabilistic serial.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Boston College Department of Economics in its series Boston College Working Papers in Economics with number 742.
Date of creation: 27 Jul 2010
Date of revision: 30 May 2011
Note: previously circulated as "The Probabilistic Serial Assignment Mechanism"
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Random assignment; Probabilistic serial; Ordinal efficiency; Fairness;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-08-06 (All new papers)
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- Eun Heo, 2014. "The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 439-454, May.
- HOUGAARD, Jens L. & moreno-ternero, JUAN D. & OSTERDAL, Lars P., 2013.
"Assigning agents to a line,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2013015, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2012. "Assigning agents to a line," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 11/2012, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark.
- Jens L. Hougaard & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero & Lars P. Osterdal, 2014. "Assigning agents to a line," Working Papers 14.01, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- Ünver, M. Utku & Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu & Hashimoto, Tadashi & Hirata, Daisuke, 2014. "Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
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