Mergers and Government Policy
AbstractIt has long been thought that government antitrust policy has an effect on aggregate merger and acquisition activity, but the empirical support for this hypothesis has been weak and inconsistent. This paper uses a new empirical specification and a new dataset on mergers and acquisitions to provide support for this conjecture. Regression analysis shows that government policy has a significant influence on mergers and that the nature of the effects depends on the type of merger. Fitting the time series into a two-state Markov switching model shows that conglomerate and horizontal time series fol low different dynamics for the last half century, which is most likely caused by the dissimilar treatment of the two types of merger by the government. Only the conglomerate merger and acquisition time series is well described by a two-state Markov switching model. In contrast, the horizontal time series has a break in the early 1980s that may be attributed to the dramatic change in government policy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Boston College Department of Economics in its series Boston College Working Papers in Economics with number 656.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 14 Nov 2006
Date of revision:
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Postal: Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Avenue, Chestnut Hill MA 02467 USA
Web page: http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC/
More information through EDIRC
Antitrust enforcement; mergers and acquisitions; time series models; Markov switching;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- C32 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes
- C50 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-11-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2006-11-18 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2006-11-18 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-LAW-2006-11-18 (Law & Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Devra L. Golbe & Lawrence J. White, 1988. "A Time-Series Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions in the U.S. Economy," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, pages 265-310 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bittlingmayer, George, 1985. "Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 77-118, April.
- Jonathan B. Baker, 2003. "The Case for Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 27-50, Fall.
- Gort, Michael, 1969. "An Economic Disturbance Theory of Mergers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 83(4), pages 624-42, November.
- Barkoulas, John T. & Baum, Christopher F. & Chakraborty, Atreya, 2001.
"Waves and persistence in merger and acquisition activity,"
Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 237-243, February.
- John T. Barkoulas & Christopher F. Baum & Atreya Chakraborty, 1997. "Waves and Persistence in Merger and Acquisition Activity," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 396, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 14 Dec 1999.
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