Agency in Project Screening and Termination Decisions: Why is Good Money Thrown after Bad?
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Other versions of this item:
- Chong-en Bai & Yijiang Wang, 1997. "Agency in Project Screening and Termination Decisions: Why Is Good Money Thrown After Bad?," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 43, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
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Cited by:
- Walsh, Patrick Paul & Whelan, Ciara, 2001.
"Firm performance and the political economy of corporate governance: survey evidence for Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia,"
Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 85-112, June.
- Patrick Paul Walsh & Ciara Whelan, 1999. "Firm Performance and the Political Economy of Corporate Governance: Survey Evidence for Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia," LICOS Discussion Papers 8599, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
- Ciara Whelan & Patrick P. Walsh, 2000. "Firm performance and the political economy of corporate governance : survey evidence for Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia," Open Access publications 10197/141, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
- Patrick Paul Walsh & Ciara Whelan, 2000. "Firm Performance and the Political Economy of Corporate Governance: Survey Evidence for Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 338, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Schaffer, Mark E., 1998.
"Do Firms in Transition Economies Have Soft Budget Constraints? A Reconsideration of Concepts and Evidence,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 80-103, March.
- Mark E. Schaffer, 1997. "Do Firms in Transition Economies have Soft Budget Constraints? A Reconsideration of the Concepts and Evidence," CERT Discussion Papers 9720, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.
- J. Kornai & E. Maskin & G. Roland, 2004.
"Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint,"
Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 11.
- János Kornai & Eric Maskin & Gérard Roland, 2003. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1095-1136, December.
- Janos Kornai & Eric Maskin & Gerard Roland, 2002. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," Economics Working Papers 0019, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
More about this item
Keywords
Soft budget; agency; project screening and termination;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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