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"Friendships" in Vertical Relations

Author

Listed:
  • Leonardo Felli
  • J. Miguel Villas-Boas

Abstract

It has been argued that collusion among the members of an organization or a vertical structure creates efficiency losses, and hence should be prevented. This paper shows that whenever collusion takes the form of co-insurance agreements, here called `friendships', among the members of a vertical structure this may not be the case. Indeed, in such a case, collusion yields only a redistribution of surplus among the members of the vertical structure. Hence, its efficiency costs may be reduced by allowing these `friendships' to take place, rather than preventing them, and accounting for the redistribution in the design of the optimal incentive scheme.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo Felli & J. Miguel Villas-Boas, 1988. ""Friendships" in Vertical Relations," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 204, Boston College Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:204
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. L. Wade, 1988. "Review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 99-100, July.
    2. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1996. "On the optimality of allowing collusion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 383-407, September.
    3. Akerlof, George A & Yellen, Janet L, 1988. "Fairness and Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 44-49, May.
    4. Leonardo Felli, 1996. "Preventing Collusion Through Discretion," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /1996/303, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    5. repec:cep:stitep:303 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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