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Information sharing and information acquisition: Ownership and coverage

Author

Listed:
  • Artashes Karapetyan

    (Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway))

  • Bogdan Stacescu

    (Norweian School of Business)

Abstract

We examine the conditions required for the existence of private credit bureaus, their ownership and coverage. Our model implies that bank consortia will most likely be preferred by banks, but that they will lead to restricted coverage. Independent credit bureaus have higher coverage, but they require good institutions. This implies an important role for public credit registers in developing countries with weak institutions. Our empirical findings largely support the implications of our model.

Suggested Citation

  • Artashes Karapetyan & Bogdan Stacescu, 2012. "Information sharing and information acquisition: Ownership and coverage," Working Paper 2011/23, Norges Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:bno:worpap:2011_23
    as

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    File URL: https://www.norges-bank.no/en/news-events/news-publications/Papers/Working-Papers/2011/WP-201123/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    4. Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 1999. "Information Sharing in Credit Markets: International Evidence," Research Department Publications 3069, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
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    7. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information sharing; Credit markets; Default; Adverse selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

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