The Efficient and Fair Approval of “Multiple-Cost-Single-Benefit” Projects Under Unilateral Information
AbstractThis paper focuses on indivisible multiple-cost–single-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the single beneficiary has complete information on the cost and benefit of the project while the government official has no such information and the cost bearers have information only on each other's costs.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University in its series Working Papers with number 2009-14.
Date of creation: May 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Faculty of Social Sciences, Bar Ilan University 52900 Ramat-Gan
Phone: Phone: +972-3-5318345
Web page: http://econ.biu.ac.il
More information through EDIRC
indivisible project; single beneficiary; multiple-cost bearers; unilateral information; efficient and fair implementation;
Other versions of this item:
- Nava Kahana & Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2009. "The Efficient and Fair Approval of "Multiple-Cost-Single-Benefit" Projects under Unilateral Information," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(6), pages 947-960, December.
- Kahana, Nava & Mealem, Yosef & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2009. "The Efficient and Fair Approval of "Multiple-Cost - Single-Benefit" Projects under Unilateral Information," IZA Discussion Papers 4181, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-04-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2010-04-17 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-PPM-2010-04-17 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kahana, Nava & Mealem, Yosef & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2008. "A complete implementation of the efficient allocation of pollution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 142-144, November.
- Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
- Bagnoli, Mark & Lipman, Barton L, 1989. "Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 583-601, October.
- Bagnoli, Mark & Lipman, Barton L, 1992. " Private Provision of Public Goods Can Be Efficient," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(1), pages 59-78, July.
- Admati, Anat R & Perry, Motty, 1991. "Joint Projects without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 259-76, April.
- John Duggan & Joanne Roberts, 2002.
"Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1070-1078, September.
- Joanne Roberts, 1999. "Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution," Working Papers jorob-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Kwerel, Evan, 1977. "To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 595-601, October.
- Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1995. "Using markets to allocate pollution permits and other scarce resource rights under limited information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 431-455, July.
- Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
- Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1990. "Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 285-299, April.
- Andrew Yates & Daniel English, 2007. "Citizens' demand for permits and Kwerel''s incentive compatible mechanism for pollution control," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 17(4), pages 1-9.
- Mutuswami, Suresh & Winter, Eyal, 2004.
"Efficient mechanisms for multiple public goods,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 629-644, March.
- JoseHerrero, Maria & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1992. "Implementation via backward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 70-88, February.
- François Maniquet, 2003.
"Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 323-346, October.
- MANIQUET, François, . "Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1734, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:17:y:2007:i:4:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
- Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1984. "Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 171-193, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Department of Economics).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.