The changing role of central banks
AbstractAlthough Central Banks have pursued the same objectives throughout their existence, primarily price and financial stability, the interpretation of their role in doing so has varied. We identify three stable epochs, when such interpretations had stabilised, ie 1. The Victorian era, 1840s to 1914; 2. The decades of government control, 1930s to 1960s; 3. The triumph of the markets, 1980s to 2007. Each epoch was followed by a confused inter-regnum, searching for a new consensual blueprint. The final such epoch concluded with a crisis, when it became apparent that macro-economic stability, the Great Moderation, plus (efficient) markets could not guarantee financial stability. So the search is now on for additional macro-prudential (counter-cyclical) instruments. The use of such instruments will need to be associated with controlled variations in systemic liquidity, and in the balance sheet of the Central Bank. Such control over its own balance sheet is the core, central function of any Central Bank, even more so than its role in setting short-term interest rates, which latter could be delegated. We end by surveying how relationships between Central Banks and governments may change over the next period.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bank for International Settlements in its series BIS Working Papers with number 326.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2010
Date of revision:
central banks; financial stability; financial regulation; bank taxes;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-12-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2010-12-18 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2010-12-18 (Central Banking)
- NEP-HIS-2010-12-18 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-MON-2010-12-18 (Monetary Economics)
- NEP-PKE-2010-12-18 (Post Keynesian Economics)
- NEP-REG-2010-12-18 (Regulation)
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