Free Riders do not Like Uncertainty
AbstractWe examine the effect of Knightian uncertainty in a simple model of public good provision. We find that uncertainty may reduce free-riding if utility is concave or there are decreasing returns to scale in the production of public goods. Comparative statics analysis shows that increases in uncerainty will increase donations.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 99-25.
Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
PUBLIC GOODS ; UNCERTAINTY ; FREE RIDERS;
Other versions of this item:
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Eichberger, J. & Kelsey, D., 1996.
"E-Capacities and the Ellsberg Paradox,"
96-13, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Dickinson, David L., 1998. "The voluntary contributions mechanism with uncertain group payoffs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 517-533, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Colin Rowat).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.