Entrepreneurship, Credit COnstraints and Education: A Model of Interdependent Loan Decisions
AbstractA macroeconomic model with endogenous credit constraints due to a moral hazard problem in lending is developed. There are two sequential borrowing decisions; first, an agent may wish to borrow to become educated and secondly, an educated agent may wish to borrow to become an entrepreneur. The possibility of rationing of entrepreneurship loans may affect the likelihood that loans are made for education purposes.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 98-13.
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
EDUCATION ; GENERATIONS ; CREDIT;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Colin Rowat).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.