The Structure of Strongly Monotonic Probabilistic Voting Procedures
AbstractPattanaik and Peleg showed that the power structure under a probabilistic voting procedure which satisfies regularity, ex-post Pareto optimally and independance of irrelevant alternatives is almost completely characterized by random dictatorship. Their characterization is not complete because it requires some additional conditions. We propose a new probabilistic monotonicity axiom called strong monotonicity and show that, if the probabilistic voting procedure is required to satisfy this new axiom along with their 3 axioms, then the distribution of coalitional power under it is completely characterized by random dictatorship.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 98-07.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
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