Legislative Lobbying and the Supply of Protection
AbstractThis paper considers the endogenous determination of administered trade rules and investigates the effects on lobbying behaviour of a less protection-friendly legislative and administered process (which could be triggered by international constraints or institutional changes, for instance).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 96-18.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
POLITICAL ECONOMY; TRADE; TARIFFS; VOTING;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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