Trade Reforms and the Protection-Seeking Process: A Uniform Distribution Approach
AbstractThis paper focuses on the possible effects on lobbying effort of a reform of the trade policy decision mechanism. In particular, an elemental evaluation of a two-stage lobbying process to seek administered and political protection is proposed, where the uncertainty concerning both the probability and the level of protection to be granted is captured by a simple uniform distribution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 96-17.
Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
TRADE; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POLITICS;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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