Monitoring Reports with a Self-Interested Inspector
AbstractIf an inspector is work averse and his effort spent on investigating reports is not observable this creates a moral hazard problem whenever there is an imperfect monitoring technology. This problem arises because the organization can not distinguish between an inspection that doesn't find evidence of misrepresented information and an inspection that just hasn't been conducted with due care. We show under what circumstances an organization can overcome this moral hazard problem and when the inspector fulfills his function of deterring falsification of reports.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 96-11.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
GAMES; GAME THEORY; INFORMATION; MORAL HAZARD; LAW;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Colin Rowat).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.