This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Endogenous Firm Objectives

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Renstrom, T.I.
Yalcin, E.
Abstract

We endogenise the objective of a monopoly firm in a general equilibrium context. Within this framework a distributional conflict occurs between shareholders, depending on their endowments. Following a political-economy approach and using voting theory, the production plan of the firm is endogenised. The economic equilibrium is characterised for different distributions of shares, and we find that a privately owned monopoly may very well act as a competitive firm, while a publicly owned monopoly may not.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 96-05.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bir:birmec:96-05

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT
Web page: http://www.economics.bham.ac.uk
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Colin Rowat).

Related research
Keywords: COMPETITION MONOPOLIES SHARES

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior
D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Roemer, John E, 1993. " Would Economic Democracy Decrease the Amount of Public Bads?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 95(2), pages 227-38.
    Other versions:
  2. Dierker, Egbert & Grodal, Birgit, 1996. "Profit Maximization Mitigates Competition," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 139-60, January.
  3. Sadanand, Asha B & Williamson, John M, 1991. "Equilibrium in a Stock Market Economy with Shareholder Voting," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(1), pages 1-35, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Petra Geraats & Hans Haller, 1998. "Shareholders' choice," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 68(2), pages 111-135, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kelsey, David & Milne, Frank, 1996. "The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 229-245. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bohm Volker, 1994. "The Foundation of the Theory of Monopolistic Competition Revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 208-218, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Frank Milne & David Kelsey, 2006. "Imperfect Competition and Corporate Governance," Working Papers 1079, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Frank Milne & David Kelsey, 2006. "Takeovers and Cooperatives," Working Papers 1113, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Dirk Willenbockel, 2005. "The Price Normalisation Problem in General Equilibriun Models with Oligopoly Power: An Attempt at Perspective," GE, Growth, Math methods 0505002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Frank Milne & David Kelsey, 2005. "Externalities, Monopoly and the Objective Function of the Firm," Working Papers 1078, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Stefano Demichelis & Klaus Ritzberger, 2007. "Corporate Control and the Stock Market," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 60, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc and its associated services are free for contributors and users, and do not accept any advertising.

This page was last updated on 2009-6-12.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.