Choice Under Partial Uncertainty
Abstract
This paper analyzes problems of choice under uncertainty where a decisionmaker does not use subjective probabilities. The decisionmaker has a set of beliefs about which states are more likely than others, but his beliefs cannot be represented as subjective probabilities. Three main kinds of decision rules are possible in this framework. These are maximin-type, maximax-type, and choosing that action that gives the highest payoff in the state, which the decisionmaker believes to be most likely. The author replaces the commonly used 'merger of states' axiom with a version of the sure-thing principle. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 91-19.Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bir:birmec:91-19
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Postal: Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT
Web page: http://www.economics.bham.ac.uk
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Related research
Keywords: decision making ; risk;Other versions of this item:
- Kelsey, David, 1993. "Choice under Partial Uncertainty," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(2), pages 297-308, May.
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Rolf Aaberge, 2002.
"Empirical Rules of Thumb for Choice under Uncertainty,"
ICER Working Papers
22-2002, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- Rolf Aaberge, 2011. "Empirical rules of thumb for choice under uncertainty," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(3), pages 431-438, September.
- Carlo Zappia, 2008. "Non-Bayesian decision theory ante-litteram: the case of G. L. S. Shackle," Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID) University of Siena 0408, Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID), University of Siena.
- Hasson, Reviva & Löfgren, Åsa & Visser, Martine, 2009.
"Climate Change in a Public Goods Game: Investment Decision in Mitigation versus Adaptation,"
Discussion Papers
dp-09-23-efd, Resources For the Future.
- Hasson, Reviva & Löfgren, Åsa & Visser, Martine, 2010. "Climate change in a public goods game: Investment decision in mitigation versus adaptation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 331-338, December.
- Hasson, Reviva & Löfgren, Åsa & Visser, Martine, 2009. "Climate Change in a Public Goods Game: Investment Decision in Mitigation versus Adaptation," Working Papers in Economics 416, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- Shaw, W. Douglass & Woodward, Richard T., 2008. "Why environmental and resource economists should care about non-expected utility models," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 66-89, January.
- John K. Stranlund & Barry C. Field, 2006. "On the Production of Homeland Security Under True Uncertainty," Working Papers 2006-5, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
- Marcello Basili & Carlo Zappia, 2010.
"Ambiguity and uncertainty in Ellsberg and Shackle,"
Cambridge Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 34(3), pages 449-474.
- Marcello Basili & Carlo Zappia, 2005. "Ambiguity and uncertainty in Ellsberg and Shackle," Department of Economics University of Siena 460, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- L. Joe Moffitt & John K. Stranlund & Barry C. Field, 2005. "Inspections To Avert Terrorism: Robustness Under Severe Uncertainty," Working Papers 2005-3, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
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