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An Economic Theory of Political Institutions: Foreign Intervention and Overseas Investments

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Author Info
Toke A. Aidt
Facundo Albornoz

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Abstract

The recent literature on endogenous political institutions highlights domestic economic factors, such as recessions, economic growth and inequality, as key determinants of political transitions. We argue that international capital flows and the possibility that foreign governments, in order to protect specific economic interests, might seek influence on the regime choice in other countries are important, yet overlooked, additional determinants of political institutions. Building on Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), we develop a theory of political transitions in economies with access to international capital markets and show that the possibility of foreign intervention significantly affects regime dynamics and the set of sustainable political regimes

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 07-03.

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Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2007
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Handle: RePEc:bir:birmec:07-03

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Related research
Keywords: Political transitions democracy autocracy foreign investments foreign government intervention

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
O15 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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  1. Alessandro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, 2004. "Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, With an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform"," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(2), pages 705-763, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alesina, Alberto & Perotti, Roberto, 1996. "Income distribution, political instability, and investment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 1203-1228, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. John P. Conley & Akram Temimi, 2001. "Endogenous Enfranchisement When Groups' Preferences Conflict," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(1), pages 79-102, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Philipp Harms & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2002. "Do Civil and Political Repression Really Boost Foreign Direct Investments?," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 40(4), pages 651-663, October.
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  5. Aidt, Toke S. & Magris, Francesco, 2006. "Capital taxation and electoral accountability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 277-291, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1994. "Representative democracy and capital taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 53-70, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bourguignon, Francois & Verdier, Thierry, 2000. "Oligarchy, democracy, inequality and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 285-313, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Justman, Moshe & Gradstein, Mark, 1999. "The Industrial Revolution, Political Transition, and the Subsequent Decline in Inequality in 19th-Century Britain," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 109-127, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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