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Building Blocks in the Economics of Mandates

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Author Info
Addison, J.T.
Barrett, C.R.
Siebert, W.S.

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Abstract

The paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investugate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers' ibsurance, and may also redistribute in favour of more "deserving" workers.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 00-07.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bir:birmec:00-07

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Postal: Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT
Web page: http://www.economics.bham.ac.uk
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Related research
Keywords: INFORMATION LABOUR EFFICIENCY

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Stewart, Jay, 1994. "The Welfare Implications of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance Markets," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 193-208, April.
  2. Charles Blackorby & David Donaldson, & John A. Weymark, 1997. "Social Aggregation and the Expected Utility Hypothesis," Old UBC Departmental Papers 9705, UBC Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  5. Aghion, P. & Hermalin, B., 1990. "Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency," DELTA Working Papers 90-14, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    Other versions:
  6. Cooper, Russell & Hayes, Beth, 1987. "Multi-period insurance contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 211-231. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Levine, David I, 1991. "Just-Cause Employment Policies in the Presence of Worker Adverse Selection," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(3), pages 294-305, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Hopenhayn, Hugo & Rogerson, Richard, 1993. "Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation: A General Equilibrium Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(5), pages 915-38, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Summers, Lawrence H, 1989. "Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 177-83, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Dionne, Georges & Lasserre, Pierre, 1987. "Adverse selection and finite-horizon insurance contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 843-861, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Alan B. Krueger, 2000. "From Bismarck to Maastricht: The March to European Union and the Labor Compact," NBER Working Papers 7456, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Christopher J. Ruhm, 1998. "The Economic Consequences Of Parental Leave Mandates: Lessons From Europe," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 285-317, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Hellwig, Martin, 1987. "Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection ," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 319-325. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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