Building Blocks in the Economics of Mandates
AbstractThe paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investugate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers' ibsurance, and may also redistribute in favour of more "deserving" workers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 00-07.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
INFORMATION ; LABOUR ; EFFICIENCY;
Other versions of this item:
- John T. Addison & C. R. Barrett & W. S. Siebert, 2005. "Building Blocks in the Economics of Mandates," GEMF Working Papers 2005-16, GEMF - Faculdade de Economia, Universidade de Coimbra.
- Addison, John T. & Barrett, C. R. & Siebert, W. Stanley, 2005. "Building Blocks in the Economics of Mandates," IZA Discussion Papers 1866, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
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