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The Emergent Seed : Simplifying the Analysis of Dynamic Evolution

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  • Kevin Hasker
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    File URL: http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~economics/papers/04-06%20DP_Hasker.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Bilkent University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 0406.

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    Date of creation: 2004
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    Handle: RePEc:bil:bilpap:0406

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    Postal: 06533 Ankara
    Phone: +90(312) 266-4807
    Fax: +90(312) 266-5140
    Web page: http://econ.bilkent.edu.tr/
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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Kandori Michihiro & Rob Rafael, 1995. "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 383-414, April.
    2. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2002. "Local Conventions," Discussion Papers 1349, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Squintani, Francesco & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002. "Imitation and Experimentation in Changing Contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 376-404, June.
    4. Gerorg N�ldeke & Larry Samuelson, . "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection In Signaling Markets," ELSE working papers 038, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    5. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2002. "Local Conventions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 0(1), pages 1.
    6. J. Bergin & B. Lipman, 2010. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 486, David K. Levine.
    7. Ellingsen, Tore, 1997. "The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(2), pages 581-602, May.
    8. M. Kandori & R. Rob, 2010. "Bandwagon Effects and Long Run Technology Choice," Levine's Working Paper Archive 501, David K. Levine.
    9. M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
    10. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September.
    11. Philip Johnson & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000. "Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 162, David K. Levine.
    12. Weibull, Jörgen W. & Saez-Marti, Maria, 1998. "Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model," Working Paper Series 507, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    13. G. Noldeke & L. Samuelson, 2010. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 538, David K. Levine.
    14. Robles, Jack, 2001. "Evolution in Finitely Repeated Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 312-330, February.
    15. van Damme, Eric & Weibull, Jorgen W., 2002. "Evolution in Games with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 296-315, October.
    16. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
    17. Arthur J Robson & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1999. "Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2112, David K. Levine.
    18. Young, H Peyton, 1998. "Conventional Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(4), pages 773-92, October.
    19. José Canals & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1998. "Multi-level evolution in population games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 21-35.
    20. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    21. Ellison, G., 1996. "Basins of Attraction, Long Run Equilibria, and the Speed of Step-by- Step Evolution," Working papers 96-4, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    22. repec:att:wimass:9324 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1995. "Social Norms and Random Matching Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 79-109, April.
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    Cited by:
    1. Kareen Rozen, 2008. "A ‘Dual’-Improved Shortcut to the Long Run," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002080, David K. Levine.

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