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The Emergent Seed : Simplifying the Analysis of Dynamic Evolution Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Kevin Hasker
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Paper provided by Bilkent University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number
0406.
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Date of creation: 2004Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bil:bilpap:0406Contact details of provider: Postal: 06533 Ankara Phone: +90(312) 266-4807 Fax: +90(312) 266-5140 Web page: http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~economics/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990.
"Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium ,"
Discussion Papers
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[Downloadable!] Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990.
"Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium ,"
Discussion Papers
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[Downloadable!] Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993.
"Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium ,"
Econometrica ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted) Kandori Michihiro & Rob Rafael, 1995.
"Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications ,"
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Jeffrey C. Ely, 2002.
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"Conventional Contracts ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
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Squintani, Francesco & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002.
"Imitation and Experimentation in Changing Contests ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 376-404, June.
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repec:att:wimass:199518r is not listed on IDEAS
Bergin, James & Lipman, Barton L, 1996.
"Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 943-56, July.
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Other versions: Noeldecke,Georg & Samuelson,Larry, .
"An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction ,"
Discussion Paper Serie B
228, University of Bonn, Germany.
Other versions: José Canals & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1998.
"Multi-level evolution in population games ,"
International Journal of Game Theory ,
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Ellingsen, Tore, 1997.
"The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 112(2), pages 581-602, May.
Other versions: Young, H Peyton, 1993.
"The Evolution of Conventions ,"
Econometrica ,
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Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993.
"Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games ,"
Econometrica ,
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Other versions: Ellison, G., 1996.
"Basins of Attraction, Long Run Equilibria, and the Speed of Step-by- Step Evolution ,"
Working papers
96-4, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Robson, Arthur J. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 1996.
"Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
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Other versions: Ellison, Glenn, 1993.
"Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September.
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Philip Johnson & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000.
"Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
162, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Michihiro, Kandori & Rob, Rafael, 1998.
"Bandwagon Effects and Long Run Technology Choice ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 30-60, January.
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Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1995.
"Social Norms and Random Matching Games ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 79-109, April.
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Saez-Marti, Maria & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1999.
"Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 268-279, June.
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Other versions:
Saez-Marti, M. & Weibull, J.W., 1998.
"Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model ,"
Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Papers
507, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
Saez-Marti, Maria & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1998.
"Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model ,"
Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
281, Stockholm School of Economics.
Weibull, Jörgen W. & Saez-Marti, Maria, 1998.
"Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model ,"
Working Paper Series
507, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
Robles, Jack, 2001.
"Evolution in Finitely Repeated Coordination Games ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 312-330, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
repec:att:wimass:199324 is not listed on IDEAS
van Damme, Eric & Weibull, Jorgen W., 2002.
"Evolution in Games with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 296-315, October.
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Young H. P., 1993.
"An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Rozen, Kareen, 2008.
"A 'Dual'-Improved Shortcut to the Long Run ,"
Working Papers
41, Yale University, Department of Economics.
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