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Characterizing core stability with fuzzy games

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  • Evan Shellshear

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    (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

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    Abstract

    This paper investigates core stability of cooperative, TU games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of a TU game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to reflect the core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium of a certain correspondence.

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    File URL: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-410.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2009
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 410.

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    Length: 14 pages
    Date of creation: Jan 2009
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:410

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    Related research

    Keywords: cooperative game; core; stable set; fuzzy coalition; fuzzy game; core stability;

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    1. Yaron Azrieli & Ehud Lehrer, 2007. "On some families of cooperative fuzzy games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 1-15, September.
    2. Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R. & Ishihara, S. & Muto, S., 2004. "On cores and stable sets for fuzzy games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-142599, Tilburg University.
    3. Weber, Robert J., 1994. "Games in coalitional form," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 36, pages 1285-1303 Elsevier.
    4. Yaron Azrieli & Ehud Lehrer, 2007. "Market Games in Large Economies with a Finite Number of Types," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 327-342, May.
    5. Yaron Azrieli & Ehud Lehrer, 2007. "Extendable Cooperative Games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(6), pages 1069-1078, December.
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