Evan Shellshear () (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
Abstract
This paper investigates core stability of cooperative, TU games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of a TU game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to reflect the core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium of a certain correspondence.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number
410.
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