Social Choice and Just Institutions: New Perspectives
AbstractIt has become accepted that social choice is impossible in absence of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. This view is challenged here. Arrow obtained an impossibility theorem only by making unreasonable demands on social choice functions. With reasonable requirements, one can get very attractive possibilities and derive social preferences on the basis of non-comparable individual preferences. This new approach makes it possible to design optimal second-best institutions inspired by principles of fairness, while traditionally the analysis of optimal second-best institutions was thought to require interpersonal comparisons of well-being. In particular, this new approach turns out to be especially suitable for the application of recent philosophical theories of justice formulated in terms of fairness, such as equality of resources.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 333.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2002
Date of revision:
social welfare; social choice; fairness; egalitarian-equivalence;
Other versions of this item:
- Fleurbaey, Marc, 2007. "Social Choice And Just Institutions: New Perspectives," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(01), pages 15-43, March.
- Marc Fleurbaey, 2006. "Social Choice and Just Institutions:New Perspectives," Working Papers halshs-00121378, HAL.
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- John Roemer, 2011. "Marc Fleurbaey, Fairness, responsibility, and welfare," Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 129-135, March.
- BOSSERT, Walter & WEYMARK, J.A., 2006.
"Social Choice: Recent Developments,"
Cahiers de recherche
01-2006, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- BOSSERT, Walter & WEYMARK, J.A., 2006. "Social Choice: Recent Developments," Cahiers de recherche 2006-01, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Walter Bossert & John A. Weymark, 2006. "Social Choice: Recent Developments," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0603, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Fabien Candau & Marc Fleurbaey, 2011. "Agglomeration and Welfare with Heterogeneous Preferences," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 685-708, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dr. Frederik Herzberg).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.