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LEVEL r CONSENSUS AND STABLE SOCIAL CHOICE

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  • Muhammad Mahajne

    (BGU)

  • Shmuel Nitzan

    (Bar-Ilan University)

  • Oscar Volij

    ()
    (BGU)

Abstract

We propose the concept of level r consensus as a useful property of a preference profile which considerably enhances the stability of social choice. This concept involves a weakening of unanimity, the most extreme form of consensus. It is shown that if a preference profile exhibits level r consensus around a given preference relation, the associated majority relation is transitive. In addition, the majority relation coincides with the preference relation around which there is such consensus. Furthermore, if the level of consensus is sufficiently strong, the Condorcet winner is chosen by all the scoring rules. Level r consensus therefore ensures the Condorcet consistency of all scoring rules, thus eliminating the tension between decision rules inspired by ranking- based utilitarianism and the majority rule.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1305.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1305

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Keywords: Social choice; unanimity; consensus; preference aggregation rules; transi- tivity; simple majority; scoring rules; invariance to rule selection;

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  1. Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521731607, April.
  2. repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00504974 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Farkas, Daniel & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1979. "The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1305-06, September.
  4. Baigent, Nick, 1987. "Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(1), pages 161-69, February.
  5. Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "On the selection of the same winner by all scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 597-601, June.
  6. Saari, Donald G., 1989. "A dictionary for voting paradoxes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 443-475, August.
  7. Lerer, Ehud & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1985. "Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 191-201, October.
  8. Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521516051, April.
  9. Hannu Nurmi, 2004. "A Comparison of Some Distance-Based Choice Rules in Ranking Environments," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 5-24, 08.
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