Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable-set solutions in the assignment market
AbstractExistence of von NeumannMorgenstern solutions (stable sets) is proved for any assignment game. For each optimal matching, a stable set is defined as the union of the core of the game and the core of the subgames that are compatible with this matching. All these stable sets exclude third-party payments and form a lattice with respect to the same partial order usually defined on the core.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 412.
Date of creation: Nov 2009
Date of revision:
assignment game; core; dominance; von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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Cahiers de recherche
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