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A Characterization of Sequential Rationalizability

Author

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  • Jose Apesteguia
  • Miguel Angel Ballester

Abstract

A choice function is sequentially rationalizable if there is an ordered collection of asymmetric binary relations that identifies the selected alternative in every choice problem. We propose a property, F-consistency, and show that it characterizes the notion of sequential rationalizability. F-consistency is a testable property that highlights the behavioral aspects implicit in sequentially rationalizable choice. Further, our characterization result provides a novel tool with which to study how other behavioral concepts are related to sequential rationalizability, and establish a priori unexpected implications. In particular, we show that the concept of rationalizability by game trees, which, in principle, had little to do with sequential rationalizability, is a refinement of the latter. Every choice function that is rationalizable by a game tree is also sequentially rationalizable. Finally, we show that some prominent voting mechanisms are also sequentially rationalizable.

Suggested Citation

  • Jose Apesteguia & Miguel Angel Ballester, 2008. "A Characterization of Sequential Rationalizability," Working Papers 345, Barcelona School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:345
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2007. "Sequentially Rationalizable Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1824-1839, December.
    2. , & ,, 2006. "A model of choice from lists," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(1), pages 3-17, March.
    3. Xu, Yongsheng & Zhou, Lin, 2007. "Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 548-556, May.
    4. Gil Kalai & Ariel Rubinstein & Ran Spiegler, 2002. "Rationalizing Choice Functions By Multiple Rationales," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2481-2488, November.
    5. Yuval Salant & Ariel Rubinstein, 2008. "(A, f): Choice with Frames -super-1," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(4), pages 1287-1296.
    6. Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O. & Le Breton, Michel, 2002. "Voting by Successive Elimination and Strategic Candidacy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 190-218, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅, 2011. "Proportional Nash solutions - A new and procedural analysis of nonconvex bargaining problems," CCES Discussion Paper Series 42, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    2. Cherepanov, Vadim & Feddersen, Timothy & ,, 2013. "Rationalization," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    individual rationality; Rationalizability; consistency; bounded rationality; behavioral economics; Voting.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles

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