Why do Differences in the Degree of Fiscal Decentralization Endure?
AbstractA notable difference between the U.S. and many countries in Europe is in the degree of fiscal decentralization. Regional (and local) governments in the U.S. have significant autonomy in setting their own taxes and determining how to spend their revenues. This is not true of their counterparts in Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Czech Republic and many other European countries. In recent years, many countries formerly subject to dictatorships or communism have been considering decentralizing fiscal responsibility to sub-national governments as part of the process of democratization (see Bird and Ebel, forthcoming). Yet, much of Europe remains immune to adopting effective decentralization in which sub-national units have true taxing authority.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 193.
Date of creation: Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Xavier Calsamiglia & Teresa Garcia-Milà & Therese J. McGuire, 2004. "Why do differences in the degree of fiscal decentralization endure?," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 865, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Xavier Calsamiglia & Teresa Garcia-Milà & Therese J. McGuire, 2006. "Why do Differences in the Degree of Fiscal Decentralization Endure?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1877, CESifo Group Munich.
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
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