Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Crowding Preferences
AbstractWe consider a set of agents who have to choose one alternative among a finite set of social alternatives. A final allocation is a pair given by the selected alternative and the group of its users. Agents have crowding preferences over allocations: between any pair of allocations with the same alternative, they prefer the allocation with the largest number of users. We require that a decision be efficient and stable (which guarantees free participation in the group of users and free exit from it). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property. The social choice function implemented by the proposed mechanism is also anonymous and group stable.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 148.
Date of creation: Nov 2004
Date of revision:
Public Goods; Crowding Preferences; Subgame Perfect Implementation;
Other versions of this item:
- Jordi Massó & Antonio Nicolò, 2004. "Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Crowding Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 638.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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- Berga, Dolors & Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2003.
"On Exiting after Voting,"
Working Papers of the Department of Economics, University of Girona
6, Department of Economics, University of Girona.
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- Dolors Berga & Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2003. "On exiting after voting," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 30(2 Year 20), pages 261-288, December.
- M. Sanver, 2006. "Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 453-460, 06.
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