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Bailouts, Moral Hazard and Banks' Home Bias for Sovereign Debt

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  • G. Gaballo
  • A. Zetlin-Jones

Abstract

We show that an increase in banks' holdings of domestic Sovereign debt decreases the ability of domestic Sovereigns to successfully enact bailouts. When Sovereigns finance bailouts with newly issued debt and the price of Sovereign debt is sensitive to unanticipated debt issues, then bailouts dilute the value of banks' Sovereign debt holdings rendering bailouts less effective. We explore this feedback mechanism in a model of financial intermediation in which banks are subject to managerial moral hazard and ex ante optimality requires lenders to commit to ex post inefficient bank liquidations. A benevolent Sovereign may desire to enact bailouts to prevent such liquidations thereby neutralizing lenders' commitment. In this context, home bias for Sovereign debt may arise as a mechanism to deter bailouts and restore lenders' commitment.

Suggested Citation

  • G. Gaballo & A. Zetlin-Jones, 2016. "Bailouts, Moral Hazard and Banks' Home Bias for Sovereign Debt," Working papers 594, Banque de France.
    • Handle: RePEc:bfr:banfra:594
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    Cited by:

    1. Craig, Ben & Giuzio, Margherita & Paterlini, Sandra, 2019. "The effect of possible EU diversification requirements on the risk of banks' sovereign bond portfolios," ESRB Working Paper Series 89, European Systemic Risk Board.
    2. Alexander Harin, 2022. "Forbidden Zones for the Expectations of Data: New Mathematical Methods and Models for Behavioral Economics," Academic Journal of Applied Mathematical Sciences, Academic Research Publishing Group, vol. 8(1), pages 12-26, 12-2021.
    3. Eichler, Stefan & Rövekamp, Ingmar, 2017. "Eurozone exit risk," CEPIE Working Papers 07/17, Technische Universität Dresden, Center of Public and International Economics (CEPIE).
    4. Capponi, Agostino & Corell, Felix & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2022. "Optimal bailouts and the doom loop with a financial network," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 35-50.
    5. Anne-Laure Delatte & Julien Fouquau & Richard Portes, 2017. "Regime-Dependent Sovereign Risk Pricing During the Euro Crisis," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(1), pages 363-385.
    6. Matthew Greenwood‐Nimmo & Viet Hoang Nguyen & Eliza Wu, 2021. "On the International Spillover Effects of Country‐Specific Financial Sector Bailouts and Sovereign Risk Shocks," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 97(317), pages 285-309, June.
    7. Harin, Alexander, 2021. "Behavioral economics. Forbidden zones. New method and models," MPRA Paper 106545, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bailout; Sovereign debt; Home bias; Time inconsistency; Commitment; Macroprudential regulation.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E0 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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