Voting in committee: firm value vs. back scratching
AbstractIn this paper, I study how the CEO's election can be biased if some directors in the board belong to the same network. I use a static Bayesian game. Directors want to elect the best candidate but they also want to vote for the winner. In that context, results show that, when no candidate is part of the network, boards with a network perform better in electing the right candidate. On the other hand, it becomes detrimental for stockholders if one candidate is part of the network. Indeed, compared to a situation where there are no interconnections between directors, the directors who are members of a network vote more often for the candidate they think is best, rather than for the one they think might win. The ones who are not part of the network follow their lead. Thus the network has power on the result of the election and therefore limits the power of the future CEO.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Banque de France in its series Working papers with number 459.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Networks; corporate governance.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-11-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-11-09 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CFN-2013-11-09 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-GTH-2013-11-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-11-09 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2013-11-09 (Network Economics)
- NEP-POL-2013-11-09 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2013-11-09 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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