Debt enforcement and the return on money
AbstractThe rate-of-return-dominance puzzle asks why low-return assets, like fiat money, are used in actual economies given that risk-free higher-return assets are available. As long as this question remains unresolved, most conclusions from monetary models which arbitrarily restrict the marketability properties of alternative assets to make money valuable are difficult to assess. In this paper, I provide a framework in which fiat money has value in equilibrium, even though a higher-return asset is available and there are neither restrictions nor transaction costs in using it. I suggest that the use of money is associated with frictions underlying debt contracts. In an environment where full enforcement is not feasible, the actual rate of return on assets is determined by incentives eliciting voluntary debt repayment. I show that the inflation rate or, more generally, the depreciation rate of an asset in which debts are denominated may function as a commitment device. As a result, money is used in equilibrium and the optimal inflation rate is positive.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Banque de France in its series Working papers with number 345.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Money; Inflation; Debt Enforcement; Banking.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E41 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Demand for Money
- E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
- E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-10-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2011-10-09 (Central Banking)
- NEP-DGE-2011-10-09 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-MAC-2011-10-09 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2011-10-09 (Monetary Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson, 1998.
"Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information,"
Game Theory and Information
- Aiyagari, S. Rao & Williamson, Stephen D., 2000. "Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 248-279, April.
- S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information," Working Paper 9807, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Aiyagari, S. Rao & Williamson, Stephen, 1997. "Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information," Working Papers 97-19, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Antonia Diaz & Fernando Perera-Tallo, 2007.
"Credit and inflation under borrower’s lack of commitment,"
Economics Working Papers
we077946, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Díaz, Antonia & Perera-Tallo, Fernando, 2011. "Credit and inflation under borrowerÊ¼s lack of commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1888-1914, September.
- Fernando Perera-Tallo & Antonia Diaz, 2007. "Credit and Inflation under Borrowers' Lack of Commitment," 2007 Meeting Papers 429, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Ricardo Lagos, 2006.
"Asset prices and liquidity in an exchange economy,"
373, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Kehoe, Timothy J & Levine, David K, 1993.
"Debt-Constrained Asset Markets,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 865-88, October.
- Aleksander Berentsen & Gabriele Camera, 2004.
"Money, Credit, and Banking,"
2004 Meeting Papers
473, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Aleksander Berentsen & Gabriele Camera & Christopher Waller, 2005. "Money, Credit and Banking," CESifo Working Paper Series 1617, CESifo Group Munich.
- Aleksander Berentsen & Gabriele Camera & Christopher Waller, . "Money, Credit and Banking," IEW - Working Papers 219, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Christian Hellwig & Guido Lorenzoni, 2006.
"Bubbles and Self-enforcing Debt,"
321307000000000383, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Trejos, Alberto & Wright, Randall, 1995. "Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 118-41, February.
- Hellwig, Martin F., 1993. "The challenge of monetary theory," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 215-242, April.
- Fernando Alvarez & Urban J. Jermann, 2000. "Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(4), pages 775-798, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marie-Christine Petit-Djemad).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.