Régime de retraite et chute de la natalité : évolution des moeurs ou arbitrage micro-économique ?
AbstractIn this paper, we develop an overlapping generations model where fertility is endogenous. The utility of the parents is a function of the number of their children, and each child implies two types of fixed costs: the financial cost and the cost in terms of time. A "pay-as-you-go" pension scheme introduces an externality in that the number of children will be fewer than optimal because their favorable impact on the level of pension income is not taken into account. First, we define the competitive equilibrium dynamics and the steady state. This allows comparisons with the optimal stationary state, a notion which generalizes the golden rule. Two instruments, pensions and child benefits, are necessary to decentralize the optimal state. Next, we compare the scenario depicted by the model with historical fact. Variations in welfare allowances may explain the entire decrease in fertility rates.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Banque de France in its series Working papers with number 119.
Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Endogenous fecundity ; Pay-as-you-go pension scheme ; Family allowances;
Other versions of this item:
- Loupias, C. & Wigniolle, B., 2000. "Regime de retraite et chute de la natalite : evolution des moeurs ou arbitrage micro-economique," Papiers d'Economie MathÃÂ©matique et Applications 2000.95, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- D9 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
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- Thomas Baudin, 2011.
"Family Policies: What Does the Standard Endogenous Fertility Model Tell Us?,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(4), pages 555-593, 08.
- Thomas Baudin, 2008. "Family policies : what does the standard endogenous fertility model tell us ?," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00275751, HAL.
- Thomas BAUDIN, 2009. "Family Policies: What Does The Standard Endogenous Fertility Model Tell Us?," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2009041, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- BAUDIN, Thomas, 2010. "Family policies : what does the standard endogenous fertility model tell us ?," CORE Discussion Papers 2010058, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Thomas Baudin, 2008. "Family policies : what does the standard endogenous fertility model tell us ?," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne v08029, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
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