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The Rule of One-Third

Author

Listed:
  • Paul Zak

    (Claremont Graduate University)

  • Rick Geddes

    (Fordham University)

Abstract

The Rule of One-Third guaranteed wives a life interest in one-third of their husband's estate upon marital dissolution. We document the ubiquity of this legal construct over four thousand years and across numerous societies. Due to specialization within the household, we demonstrate that without a wife's residual claim on her husband's estate, children's outcomes are imperiled. Using ancient Roman law as an example, we argue that the patriarch, or paterfamilias, is the primary legal entity with an interest in creating and enforcing the Rule of One-Third. Then, in a game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that the Rule of One-Third obtains when mothers' and fathers' are equally important at producing children's human capital, and when this rule is enforced by the paterfamilias or by modern legal institutions. We conclude that the Rule of One-Third arose in many societies because it places the cost of marital dissolution on the household rather than society, and solves a contracting problem between the husband and wife when each is specialized in tasks the other cannot perform well.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Zak & Rick Geddes, "undated". "The Rule of One-Third," Gruter Institute Working Papers on Law, Economics, and Evolutionary Biology 1-1-1004, Berkeley Electronic Press.
  • Handle: RePEc:bep:grleeb:1-1-1004
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    File URL: http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=giwp
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Rick Geddes & Dean Lueck & Sharon Tennyson, 2012. "Human Capital Accumulation and the Expansion of Women's Economic Rights," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(4), pages 839-867.
    2. Smith, Ian, 2007. "Property division on divorce with inequity aversion," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 111-128.
    3. Paul J. Zak, 2002. "Genetics, family structure, and economic growth," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 343-365.

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    Keywords

    Marriage; Divorce; Human Capital; Institutions;
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