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VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities

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Author Info
Daniel Kraehmer () (Free University of Berlin, Department of Economics)
Roland Strausz () (Free University of Berlin, Department of Economics)

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Abstract

For mechanism design with independent values, we identify a subclass of Vickrey--Clarke--Groves (VCG) mechanisms that induce efficient ex ante investments even with externalities. The Vickrey second price auction does not belong to this class.

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Paper provided by Departmental Working Papers in its series Papers with number 031.

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Date of creation: 08 Feb 2006
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Handle: RePEc:bef:lsbest:031

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Related research
Keywords: externalities; ex ante investments; efficient mechanisms; mechanism design; second price auction;

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  1. Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon, 2004. "Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(1), pages 1-18, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2002. "Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 1007-1033, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Johannes Münster, 2006. "Contests with Investment," Discussion Papers 120, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Johannes Münster, 2007. "Contests with investment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(8), pages 849-862. [Downloadable!]
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