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Un análisis histórico de la independencia de la banca central en América Latina: la experiencia colombiana, 1923-2008

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  • Adolfo Meisel Roca.
  • Juan David Barón.

Abstract

Este documento explora la relación entre la independencia del banco central y los niveles de inflación en América Latina, usando como estudio de caso la experiencia de Colombia (1923-2008). Desde su creación en 1923 la independencia y objetivos del banco central en Colombia han sido modificados substancialmente. Entre 1923 y 1951 el banco central fue un ente privado e independiente, teniendo como objetivo principal la estabilidad de precios. En 1962 la responsabilidad monetaria se dividió entre la Junta Monetaria, encargada del diseño de la política monetaria, y el banco central, que la ejecutaba. A principios de los años noventa el banco recobró su independencia y su objetivo pasó a ser el control de la inflación. Los niveles de inflación en estos períodos fueron diferentes. El análisis sugiere que la combinación de un banco central independiente con un objetivo de estabilidad de precios produce mejores resultados en tales términos.

Suggested Citation

  • Adolfo Meisel Roca. & Juan David Barón., 2010. "Un análisis histórico de la independencia de la banca central en América Latina: la experiencia colombiana, 1923-2008," Cuadernos de Historia Económica 25, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdr:cheedt:25
    DOI: 10.32468/chee.25
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Inflación; Independencia del Banco Central; Latinoamérica; Colombia.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N16 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • N26 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Latin America; Caribbean

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