Individually Rational Colective Choice Under Random Preferences
AbstractIn this paper I consider the following problem: There is a collection of, exogenously given, socially feasible sets, and for each one of them, each one of a group of individuals chooses from an individually feasible set. The fact that the product of the individually feasible sets is larger than the socially feasible set notwithstanding, there arises no conflict between individuals. Assuming that individual preferences are random, I here characterize collective choices in terms of the way in wich individual preferences must co-vary in orden to explain them. I do this by combining standard revealed preference theory and its counterpart under random preferences.I also argue that there exist collective choices that cannon be rationalized, and hence that the individual rationality assumption can be refuted.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Banco de la Republica de Colombia in its series Borradores de Economia with number 232.
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Revealed preference; random utility; collective choice; individual rationality.;
Other versions of this item:
- Andrés Carvajal, 2004. "Individually-Rational Collective Choice under Random Preferences," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/29, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Nov 2004.
- Andrés Carvajal, 2003. "Individually Rational Collective Choice Under Random Preferences," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 002839, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-04-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2003-04-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2003-04-02 (Discrete Choice Models)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rosa L. Matzkin & Marcel K. Richter, 1987.
"Testing Strictly Concave Rationality,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
844, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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