Price Competition on Network
AbstractWe present a model of imperfect price competition where not all firms can sell to all consumers. A network structure models the local interaction of firms and consumers. We find that aggregate surplus is maximized with a fully connected network, which corresponds to perfect competition, and decreases monotonically as the network becomes less connected until firms become local monopolists. When we study which networks are likely to form in equilibrium, we find that stable networks are not fully connected but are connected enough to rule out local monopolists. Our results extend to oligopolistic competition when consumers can either buy from a single firm or from all firms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Banco de México in its series Working Papers with number 2011-04.
Date of creation: Jul 2011
Date of revision:
Network markets; price competition; oligopoly competition; Bertrand competition.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-07-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-07-13 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2011-07-13 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MKT-2011-07-13 (Marketing)
- NEP-NET-2011-07-13 (Network Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
- Blume, Lawrence E. & Easley, David & Kleinberg, Jon & Tardos, Éva, 2009. "Trading networks with price-setting agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 36-50, September.
- Corominas-Bosch, Margarida, 2004. "Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 35-77, March.
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