School cheating and social capital
AbstractIn this paper we propose and validate cheating in standardized tests as a new indirect measure of social capital. Given the low-stakes nature of most of the tests examined here, we interpret the widespread presence of cheating as a signal of limited trustin central education authorities. Cheating is negatively correlated with several social capital proxies in the local environment where a school is located (the municipality or the province), even controlling for area-wide differences in social capital and for a number of features of the local environment. When distinguishing between different kinds of social capital – contrasting universalistic and particularistic social values (along the lines of de Blasio, Scalise and Sestito, forthcoming) – cheating appears to be negatively correlated only with measures of universalistic social values (while the correlation of cheating with particularistic social values, if any, is positive). We also document a number of empirical regularities in cheating behavior: (i) within classes student homogeneity is associated with higher cheating (Lucifora and Tonello, 2012); (ii) the presence of external inspectors greatly reduces cheating (Bertoni, Brunello and Rocco, 2013), and to a greater extent in low social capital environments; (iii) in primary schools, cheating is more pervasive in smaller classes; (iv) and a larger share of “local” teachers, or of teachers with a permanent contract, is generally associated with higher levels of cheating.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area in its series Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) with number 952.
Date of creation: Feb 2014
Date of revision:
cheating; social capital;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-03-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-EDU-2014-03-08 (Education)
- NEP-SOC-2014-03-08 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-URE-2014-03-08 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Shanker Satyanath & Nico Voigtländer & Hans-Joachim Voth, 2013.
"Bowling for Fascism: Social Capital and the Rise of the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany, 1919-33,"
703, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Shanker Satyanath & Nico Voigtländer & Joachim Voth, 2013. "Bowling for fascism: Social capital and the rise of the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany, 1919-33," Economics Working Papers 1375, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Satyanath, Shanker & Voigtländer, Nico & Voth, Hans-Joachim, 2013. "Bowling for Fascism: Social Capital and the Rise of the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany: 1919-33," CEPR Discussion Papers 9595, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marco Bertoni & Giorgio Brunello & Lorenzo Rocco, 2013.
"When the cat is near, the mice won't play: the effect of external examiners in Italian schools,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
48918, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Bertoni, Marco & Brunello, Giorgio & Rocco, Lorenzo, 2013. "When the cat is near, the mice won't play: The effect of external examiners in Italian schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 65-77.
- Marco Bertoni & Giorgio Brunello & Lorenzo Rocco, 2012. "When the Cat is Near, the Mice Wonft Play: The Effect of External Examiners in Italian Schools," ISER Discussion Paper 0845, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Marco Bertoni & Giorgio Brunello & Lorenzo Rocco, 2013. "When the Cat is Near, the Mice Won't Play: The Effect of External Examiners in Italian Schools," CEP Discussion Papers dp1191, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Bertoni, Marco & Brunello, Giorgio & Rocco, Lorenzo, 2012. "When the Cat Is Near, the Mice Won't Play: The Effect of External Examiners in Italian Schools," IZA Discussion Papers 6629, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
- Fehr, Ernst, 2008.
"On the Economics and Biology of Trust,"
IZA Discussion Papers
3895, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Ernst Fehr, 2008. "On the Economics and Biology of Trust," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 154, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
- Ernst Fehr, 2009. "On the economics and biology of trust," IEW - Working Papers 399, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Vigdor, Jacob L., 2002. "Interpreting ethnic fragmentation effects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 271-276, April.
- Bisin, Alberto & Verdier, Thierry, 2001.
"The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 298-319, April.
- Bisin, A. & Verdier, T., 1997. "The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences," DELTA Working Papers 97-03, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Tabellini, Guido, 2007.
"The Scope of Cooperation: Values and incentives,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6534, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Guido Tabellini, 2007. "The Scope of Cooperation: values and incentives," Working Papers 328, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Guido Tabellini, 2008. "The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 2236, CESifo Group Munich.
- Brian A. Jacob & Steven D. Levitt, 2003.
"Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating,"
NBER Working Papers
9413, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brian A. Jacob & Steven D. Levitt, 2003. "Rotten Apples: An Investigation Of The Prevalence And Predictors Of Teacher Cheating," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(3), pages 843-877, August.
- Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, 2007. "Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1020-1048, December.
- Giuseppe Albanese & Guido de Blasio & Paolo Sestito, 2013. "Trust and preferences: evidence from survey data," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 911, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Barbieri, Gianna & Rossetti, Claudio & Sestito, Paolo, 2011. "The determinants of teacher mobility: Evidence using Italian teachers’ transfer applications," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 1430-1444.
- Durante, Ruben & Labartino, Giovanna & Perotti, Roberto, 2011.
"Academic Dynasties: Decentralization and Familism in the Italian Academia,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
8645, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ruben Durante & Giovanna Labartino & Roberto Perotti, 2011. "Academic Dynasties: Decentralization and Familism in the Italian Academia," NBER Working Papers 17572, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lucifora, Claudio & Tonello, Marco, 2012. "Students' Cheating as a Social Interaction: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in a National Evaluation Program," IZA Discussion Papers 6967, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.