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The Italian Administrative System: Why a Source of Competitive Disadvantage?

Author

Listed:
  • Magda Bianco

    (Banca d'Italia, Structural Economic Analysis Department)

  • Giulio Napolitano

    (Roma Tre University)

Abstract

The Italian administrative system is currently perceived as one of the main obstacles to a higher growth of the productive system. We argue that some causes of this ineffectiveness are deeply rooted and date back at the unification: a missing strong administrative tradition; an (excessive) political influence over the administration; the relevance of the juridical culture. We discuss in detail one specific “product†of the administration, its civil justice system, its inefficiencies over time and the potential reasons behind it. We then detail how some “reactions†to these inefficiencies have been in some cases the sources of further problems: an excessive number of (often too complicated) laws and administrative acts; the growth of administrative corruption; the creation of “public†agencies formally external to the administration. It is possibly in some of these elements that the reasons for the difficulties met by the reform processes initiated since the 1990s should be searched.

Suggested Citation

  • Magda Bianco & Giulio Napolitano, 2011. "The Italian Administrative System: Why a Source of Competitive Disadvantage?," Quaderni di storia economica (Economic History Working Papers) 24, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdi:workqs:qse_24
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    Cited by:

    1. Gabriele Gratton & Luigi Guiso & Claudio Michelacci & Massimo Morelli, 2017. "From Weber to Kafka: Political Instability and the Rise of an Inefficient Bureaucracy," EIEF Working Papers Series 1708, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised May 2017.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    public administration; civil justice; administrative law;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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